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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
CONFINING AND CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION 
WITHIN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
CHARLES H. KOCH* 
A study of administrative law is largely an examination of the confin-
ing and controlling of administrative discretion. Until fairly recently, this 
study was limited to examination of quasi-judicial procedures and control of 
quasi-judicial decisions through judicial review. Yet much of the exercise of 
discretion falls outside the quasi-judicial agency functions. Consequently, 
scrutiny of a wider range of discretionary processes is essential. 
In the past, movement in this direction was inhibited by an unrealistic 
assumption against the propriety of administrative discretion. Great strides 
in dealing with discretion were possible only after theorists recognized that 
discretion is necessary to the successful functioning of our system. Efforts to 
completely eliminate discretion are fruitless and must fail. We now recog-
nize that to cope with discretion we must first admit the need for it and try to 
understand its exercise so that it can be confined and controlled where doing 
so will in fact, not in theory, improve the services the government renders 
its citizens. 
Advocates of controlling discretion rely in varying degrees on the 
courts as an instrument for achieving the necessary reforms. Because judi-
cial courts can only react retrospectively to the cases presented to them and 
the courts can handle only a limited number of cases, the best hope for 
effective reform may be in legislative or administrative action. Judicial 
review does serve, however, to stimulate reform. For example, discussion 
of court action impacts on congressional and administrative handling of 
discretionary justice problems. Consequently, while the real solution to 
• Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University; LL.M., University of Chicago; J.D., 
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most discretionary justice problems may lie in legislative or executive 
action, discussions, such as this one, which concentrate on the potential role 
of the judiciary in confining or controlling discretion can contribute to 
solutions. 
Courts have been somewhat reluctant to embark into the less charted 
areas of administrative action. Part of the reason for this must lay with the 
failure of practitioners to gain the sophisticated understanding of administra-
tive law necessary to make adequate presentations. But a great deal of the 
cause has to rest on the administrative law theorists and teachers who have 
not given courts or practitioners the necessary guidance. 
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis offers the most help in this area. Indeed, 
the subject matter would be a great deal poorer but for him. He raised 
interest with his book on discretionary justice, 1 and, since that book, he has 
continued to push for study of informal and discretionary action. 2 His 
general plan would structure the exercise of discretion through open plans, 
open policy statements, open rules, open findings, open reasons, open 
precedents and fair informal procedure, and would check discretion through 
official supervision whereby one officer would check another. 3 Substantial 
contributions made by several commentators4 and greater involvement by 
the judiciary5 has resulted in important analytical development in recent 
years. 
In the last year, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
explored the problems of administrative discretion. Often, its approach has 
been sophisticated. As a result, it has become one of the leaders in devel-
oping useful techniques for confining and controlling discretion. 
Discretion exercised in informal adjudicatory-type administrative ac-
tion has puzzled the judiciary and commentators alike and, hence, a good 
deal of difficult law has been made in the seventies about procedures for 
informal agency adjudication. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
is among those courts which continually examine the problem of structuring 
I. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). 
2. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 4.08-3 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as DAVIS SEVENTIES]; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§§ 4.13-4.22 (Supp. 1970) 
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS SuPP. 1970]. 
3. DAVIS SuPP. 1970, supra note 2, at§§ 4.14-4.18. 
4. The Administrative Conference of the United States has produced several studies on 
the exercise of discretion in the administrative agencies. See generally ADMIN. CONF. OF THE 
U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1968-1976); Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule making: Some Recent De-
velopments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 Duke L.J. 51; Sofaer, Judicial Control of 
Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1293 (1972). 
5. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, for example, has played a significant 
role in the development of administrative law, as this article will demonstrate. 
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informal adjudicatory action, and it has contributed valuable thinking 
concerning the myriad problems involved with the notion of ''some kind of 
hearing" for informal adjudication. 6 In addition, the Seventh Circuit has 
worked to check the growth of unnecessary discretion by insisting that 
agencies follow their own precedent and rules or explain why they chose to 
deviate from prior policies. By requiring consistency in informal action, 
unnecessary discretion will be further limited. More important is the 
Seventh Circuit's continued use of required rule-making as a remedy for too 
much delegated discretion. Required rule-making assigns the agencies, 
rather than the courts or the legislatures, the task of building the boundaries 
around broad discretion. The notion of judicially required rule-making is 
one of the most important developments in the effort to confine and control 
discretion and the Seventh Circuit has been, and continues to be, a leader in 
the growth of this practical technique for limiting unnecessary discretion. 
Because of the Seventh Circuit's advanced work in all of these areas of 
administrative discretion, the discussion below is more than a review of 
recent cases; it is an analysis of the circuit's recent contributions to the 
development and implementation of the several techniques for assuring 
discretionary justice in the administrative process. 
STRUCfURING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION: PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
IN INFORMAL ADJUDICATION 
Discretionary action may take numerous forms of which informal 
adjudication7 is only one. While more numerous than formal adjudication, 
informal adjudication is a small portion of all discretionary action, 8 but its 
direct impact on citizens' lives makes it a most important type of discretion-
ary action. Recently, a great deal has been said about structuring discretion 
6. See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
7. Informal adjudication, in a general way, refers to discretionary action related to a 
specific individual or group taken without formalized procedures. It increasingly represents a 
type of informal exercise of discretion for which some formality, short of trial-type procedure, 
may be profitably considered. 
The term 'informal adjudication' has no commonly accepted meaning .... [l]t broad-
ly refers to administrative decisions that are not governed by statutory procedures, but 
which nevertheless affect an individual's rights, obligations, or opportunities. Perhaps 
it is easier to say what the term does not mean. It does not mean rulemaking, either 
formal or informal under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Nor does it 
mean formal adjudication, as defined either_by sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA 
or by organic agency legislation that establishes comparable procedure formality. A 
key indicium of formality in this context is the presence of an administrative law judge 
as the presiding official. In essence, informal adjudication is a residual category of 
pr~cedural entitlement that grows or diminishes in 'formality' more by judicial and 
administrative notions of fairness than by legislative plan or design. 
Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739 n.l (1976). 
8. DAVIS SUPP. 1970, supra note 2, at § 4.13; see Gardner, The Procedures By Which 
Informal Action Is Taken, 24 Ao. L. REv. 155, 156 (1972). · 
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when exercised through informal adjudication. 9 The Supreme Court of the 
United States and the other federal courts continue to struggle with the 
complex problem of devising the right level of formality in each of the 
myriad informal adjudicative activities. 10 
Like all other federal courts, the Seventh Circuit has had to apply the 
amorphous Supreme Court law on informal adjudication to specific cases. 11 
The question of proper informal procedures lies on the periphery of several 
recent Seventh Circuit opinions. 12 The Seventh Circuit continues its explo-
ration of the problem of damage liability for violation of due process in the 
exercise of discretion in informal adjudicative situations. 13 It also offered 
some guidance as to when an agency has statutory authority to choose 
informal adju.dication over formal adjudication. 14 
9. Numerous important scholarly contributions have been produced recently. Among the 
most useful are Friendly, supra note 6; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus 
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of 
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976); Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring 
Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 60 (1976); 
Verkuil, supra note 7. 
10. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 28 n.l. 
II. The Seventh Circuit also considered formal adjudication during the last term. Relying 
on Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 1261 (1977) 
the court held that Congress could assign an agency the task of adjudicating health and safety 
violations without providing for trial by jury. Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm'n, 553 F.2d 1078, 1080 (7th Cir. 1977). 
The Seventh Circuit also reasserted that private contract principles do not apply to 
government consent settlement agreements and, hence, a respondent cannot withdraw from a 
settlement agreement even though the agency has not finally accepted a proposed consent 
order. Johnson Products Co. v. FTC, 549 F.2d 35, 38 (7th Cir. 1977). 
In United States Steel Co. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit found 
considerable flexibility in the formal procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act. 
An initial decision from the employee presiding at the hearing is not required for "applications 
for initial licenses," 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(A) (1970), or where "the agency requires, either in 
specific cases or by general rule, the entire record to be certified to it for decision." 5 U .S.C. § 
557(b) (1970). 556 F.2d at 834-35. The court also found that one seeking a permit was the 
"proponent of a rule or order" and must bear the burden of proof under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970). 556 F.2d at 834. 
In Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1977), the court found that expert consultant 
opinion based on medical reports rather than examination was not inadmissible hearsay, but 
should be given little weight in arriving at the decision. But see text accompanying notes 97-101 
infra. 
In Squillacote v. Teamsters Local 344, 56! F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit 
explored in depth the exception to the exhaustion doctrine. The case actually involves the 
related problem of when access to district court is permitted where the statute requires direct 
appeal of final order to the court of appeals. The decision takes a very narrow view of the 
exception. A district court is, of course, the appropriate forum to challenge an agency sub-
poena. 
12. One case, Hathway v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976), offered a particularly 
valuable opportunity for the court to delve into the problems of informal adjudication. See text 
accompanying notes 57-69 infra. 
13. See text accompanying notes 108-25 infra. 
14. See text accompanying notes 126-57 infra. 
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When are Procedures Required for Informal Adjudication? 
The Seventh Circuit, along with the entire federal judiciary, 15 has been 
wrestling with the new developments in the law of informal adjudication. 
Goldberg v. Kelly 16 is generally conceded to be the antecedent to the great 
mass of inquiries into what procedures are required in informal adjudicative 
procedures. 
Goldberg marked the initiation of a trend to extend the application of 
due process requirements into the area of executive and administrative 
action which had been the exclusive domain of adminstrators exercising 
unstructured discretionY Goldberg compels courts to look at a seemingly 
infinite variety of informal action to determine whether more formality is 
required. Because of that case, a great experiment has been undertaken to 
examine when fairness and feasibility combine to indicate new procedural 
prescriptions. 18 These inquiries have brought about a due process explosion 
as the entire federal judiciary is laboring to find order after the cataclysmic 
decision in Goldberg. 
Goldberg involved state termination of public assistance payments 
without an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination. 19 
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Supreme Court, stated "that the pre-
termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial 
trial.' ' 20 However, the Supreme Court imposed a plethora of evidentiary 
type procedures on the pre-termination decision-making process. 21 In hold-
ing that these public aid recipients were entitled to what amounted to an 
evidentiary hearing, the Supreme Court relied on a characterization of 
welfare benefits as something approaching a property right: "a matter of 
statutory entitlement.' ' 22 The Court seemed to find that this entitlement 
necessitated some due process safeguards before the benefits could be taken. 
''The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient 
is influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer 
15. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1273; Mashaw, supra note 9, at 28 n.l. 
16. 397 u.s. 254 (1970). 
17. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 29; Verkuit, supra note 7, at 739; Note, Procedural Due 
Process: AfterGoss v. Lopez, 1976 D.UKE L.J. 409,411. 
18. The Administrative Conference has also been working to examine the problem of 
whether more procedures for informal action should be required. See Clagett, supra note 4, at 
63-64; Gardner, supra note 8, at 163-64. 
19. The state, subsequent to the filing of the suit, adopted informal procedures which 
included a conference with a caseworker, supervision, a statement of reasons for termination 
and the right to higher level administrative review. In addition, a denied claimant could seek an 
evidentiary-type hearing after termination. 
20. 397 U.S. at 266. 
21. ld. at 266-71. 
22. ld. at 262. 
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grievous loss' ... and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in 
avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudi-
cation. " 23 The Court suggested a balancing of interests. It found that the 
costs of losing the minimal level of sustenance provided under the program 
outweighed the additional expense that would be imposed on the govern-
ment by requiring additional procedural safeguards. 24 
In this case, the Supreme Court pushed for ''some kind of hearing'' in 
a number of discretionary situations. 25 While the 1973 term showed some 
pull back, the 1974 term brought resumed development. 26 There no longer 
can be any exercise of administrative discretion which is beyond procedural 
scrutiny. Some formality may be added to any informal discretionary ac-
tion. 27 
Despite the quantity of Supreme Court pronouncements, there is no 
clear standard for the imposition of some procedures on administrative 
discretion. The inquiry usually begins with the question of whether due 
process is required in a particular decision-making process and then, where 
required, what is the requisite process necessary to meet that standard. 28 
The first analysis of whether due process is required begins with the 
theoretical qualification that the requirements of procedural due process 
apply only to deprivations of "life, liberty, or property" protected by the 
fifth and fourteenth amendments. New notions of protected liberty and 
property, however, infinitely expand the potential application of the doc-
trine. At one time a distinction was drawn between those governmental 
benefits characterized as "rights" and those characterized as 
"privileges. " 29 Due process guarantees were held not to apply to depriva-
23. Id. at 262-63. 
24. Id. at 266. Balancing individual interest against governmental or community interests 
is one of the doctrinal concepts derived from this case and others. For a valuable discussion of 
·this concept, see Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on 
the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1510 (1975). 
25. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1273-74. 
26. Id. at 1274. 
27. Another question which pervades these cases is whether a hearing must precede the 
final discretionary determination: 
One line suggested a presumption in favor of prior evidentiary hearings: The depriva-
tion of any substantial interest prior to an opportunity for hearing would have to be 
justified by some reasonably compelling governmental necessity. The other line 
seemed to reverse that presumption: summary process that preliminarily disposed of 
property or other interests was acceptable, provided there was later opportunity for a 
hearing that might lead to a reinstatement of the interest. 
Mashaw, supra note 9, at 36-37. 
28. E.g., Coppenbarger v. Federal Aviation Administration, 558 F.2d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
29. E.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (practice of medicine is a 
privilege); United States ex rei. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,542 (1950) (admission of 
aliens to U.S. is a privilege). See generally DAVIS SUPP. 1970, supra note 2, at§§ 7.11-7. 13; Van 
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 
1439 (1968). 
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tions of privileges, on the theory that the government had a free hand in 
denying benefits which were mere "privileges." Recently, the Supreme 
Court has heeded critics of this distinction and refused to deny appropriate 
procedures in cases which might well involve traditional privileges. 30 Reso-
lution of the due process question no longer depends on this distinction. 
Indeed, the class of protected property interests extends well beyond actual 
ownership of legal property and the class of protected liberty interests 
beyond mere freedom from overt restraintY The analysis of when more 
formalized procedures are necessary for informal adjudication looks to new 
definitions of liberty rights and property rights. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Board of Regents v. Roth32 serves as a 
foundation for defining protected liberty interests. The case involved the 
firing of an assistant professor at a state school. Since the professor had 
taught only one year, and did not have tenure, his reappointment was left to 
the ''unfettered discretion'' of university officials. The Court found that the 
respondent was not deprived of procedural due process because he did not 
show deprivation of liberty or property protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court analyzed both the liberty interest and the property interest. 
As to the liberty interest, the Court found that minimal requirements of due 
process must be satisfied "where a person's good name, reputation, honor, 
or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him.' ' 33 
This language, and the holdings of other cases, substantially expanded the 
perimeter of liberty interest beyond the historical meaning of the term. The 
cases delineate two situations in which harm to a person's liberty interest 
requires due process safeguards: 
(1) where the government has made charges against the individual 
which might seriously damage his standing and associations within 
his community, or which threatens his good name, reputation, 
honor, or integrity, and (2) where the state imposes a stigma or 
other disability upon the individual that forecloses his freedom to 
take advantage of future employment opportunities. 34 
Harm to these liberty interests must be "serious. " 35 
Property interest has given rise to a more sophisticated application of 
Goldberg principles. A comparison of Roth with a case based on similar 
facts, Perry v. Sindermann, 36 indicates a boundary between protected and 
30. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 482 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,539 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 374 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). 
31. Note, supra note 17, at 412. 
32. 408 u.s. 564 (1972). 
33. /d. at 573. 
34. Note, supra note 17, at 420. 
35. /d. 
36. 408 u.s. 593 (1972). 
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unprotected property interests. Both cases involved the dismissal of non-
tenured teachers. In Perry, however, the Court refused to permit non-
retention without first affording some kind of procedures. The Court found 
in Perry a de facto tenure system. Sindermann had more than Roth's mere 
expectancy of employment. Because of the de facto tenure, Sindermann's 
interest had ripened into a property interest in his job which could be 
terminated only for cause. Rules and understandings officially promulgated 
by the college gave Sindermann a legitimate claim of entitlement to job 
tenureY This entitlement demanded some procedural safeguards. 38 As the 
Court said, in refusing to impose procedures in Roth: ''To have a property 
interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need 
or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation .... He 
must . . . have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. " 39 
Employment has been the one area where the concept of property 
interest has taken the firmest hold. Shifting the analysis from examining the 
usefulness of procedures to defining property interests has undermined an 
entire line of job security cases.40 Recently, in Bishop v. Wood,41 the 
Supreme Court relied on distinguishing property interest from the absence of 
property interest to permit termination of employment without procedures. 
Bishop was dismissed from the city police after three years because the chief 
of police claimed he had failed to discharge his duties properly. The 
dismissal came after a conference with the chief and the city manager. At no 
time was he given an evidentiary hearing. In upholding the dismissal, the 
Supreme Court distinguished Arnett v. Kennedy, 42 a prior case in which it 
required procedural safeguards. In doing so, the Court stated that: 
In [Arnett] the Court concluded that because the employee could 
only be discharged for cause, he had a property interest which was 
entitled to constitutional protection. In [Bishop], a holding that as 
a matter of state law the employee 'held his position at the will and 
pleasure of the city' necessarily establishes that he had no proper-
ty interest. 43 
These cases exemplify the regressive process which has destroyed the 
promise of Goldberg. The genius of the Goldberg decision is not its 
individual holding but its focus on the need to impose procedural safeguards 
in informal actions. The recent line of entitlement cases eschews flexibility 
for "once a property interest was established the inquiry into what process 
37. Id. at 601-02. 
38. See generally Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974 
DuKE L.J. 89 for a discussion and criticism of the entitlement doctrine. 
39. 408 U.S. at 577. 
40. Rabin, supra note 9, at 73. 
41. 426 u.s. 341 (1976). 
42. 416 u.s. 134 (1974). 
43. 426 U.S. at 345 n.8. 
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was due developed variations on a single theme: the adjudicatory hearing 
model. ''44 
Nowhere is this inflexible approach more destructive than in employ-
ment cases. The inquiry should avoid definitional analysis of what consti-
tutes a property interest and proceed, instead, toward assurance of some 
procedures in many more situations. 45 Attention must not be diverted from 
the crucial question: due process is always required for all administrative 
action and, hence, the search should be for the process in each exercise of 
discretion which will be fair not only to the individual or group directly 
involved but also the entire populace. While many opinions focus undue 
attention in interest definition, the Supreme Court has often analyzed the 
problem in terms of the appropriateness of additional procedures. 
In Mathews v. Eldridge ,46 the majority opinion articulates a set of 
criteria with a comprehensiveness that suggests a preliminary integration of 
the Court's recent efforts to impose additional procedures. 47 The case arose 
from the Social Security Administration's affirmance of a state agency's 
finding that Eldridge was no longer disabled, resulting in termination of 
disability benefits. The administrative decision was the result of an informal 
investigation and a brief statement of reason was provided. Nonetheless, 
Eldridge argued that he could not get a proper airing of his claim except at 
an oral hearing before an impartial hearing official. An overwhelming 
majority upheld the Social Security Administration's termination procedure. 
The generalized criteria agreed upon by the entire Supreme Court would 
have a court consider: 
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such inter-
est through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail. 48 
According to these criteria a court must first weigh the extent of the 
private interest involved. This process is very subjective and impressionist-
ic.49 An example is the Court's own effort to distinguish Eldridge from the 
welfare recipients protected by Goldberg on the grounds that Goldberg had 
involved an income maintenance scheme of last resort for those in financial 
44. Rabin, supra note 9, at 75. 
45. See Rabin, supra note 9, at 77. 
46. 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 
47. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 29. Professor Mashaw suggests that the case also marks the 
point at which the court began to avoid "balancing" analysis by finding the due process clause 
inapplicable. /d. at 29 n.5. 
48. 424 U.S. at 335. 
49. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 39. 
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need, while the Social Security disability system in Eldridge made pay-
ments to the disabled irrespective of financial necessity. 50 
The second factor, value of additional procedural safeguards, raises the 
crucial question.5' The Court determined that additional or alternative pro-
cedure, particularly oral presentation or evidentiary hearing, would add little 
to the determination. The decision before the agency was essentially techni-
cal fact-finding. For such decisions, accuracy and veracity could be guaran-
teed by the investigatory procedures used by the agency. The written 
procedures were well designed; they provided reasons for tentative deci-
sions and an opportunity to submit additional written evidence. 52 Nonethe-
less, for some reason, face-to-face contact with the decision-maker seems to 
make a substantial difference in the outcome of such cases. The Supreme 
Court was troubled by the high reversal rate where there were agency 
reconsiderations after a hearing. Professor Mashaw suggests that, in this 
context, accuracy may be meaningless and consistency at least unachiev-
able; hence, "[oral hearing] may make sense precisely because accuracy 
and consistency are so elusive in this system.' '53 The subjective nature of 
the decision suggests to him procedures which increase the input of intang-
ibles. Yet, the high reversal rate does not necessarily demonstrate that 
hearing officers are more just; they may merely be more lenient. A just 
system may demand less subjective decisions, unaffected by psychological 
drives to bestow charity on a particular individual with whom the decision-
maker is made to empathize by personal contact. 54 Community interests are 
cheated by decisions which grant money to the undeserving. Funds available 
to the needy will be depleted by useless evidentiary proceedings. Overall 
justice may lie in permitting abbreviated procedures where, as here, such 
procedures are not demonstrably incompetent. 
Therefore, the third consideration, public interest, becomes exceeding-
ly important, not only to the generalized interests, but to the particular 
interests the system is attempting to help. A court must consider both the 
costs of making additional procedures available and the money and psycho-
logical costs of bestowing benefits on ineligible recipients. Increasingly, we 
are being made aware of the fact that public funds are not infinite. 55 The key 
question is how to optimize the impact of the finite and relatively scarce 
50. 424 U.S. at 340-41. The Court does acknowledge in Goldberg that the "degree of 
difference can be overstated." ld. at 341. 
51. See text accompanying notes 70-96 infra. 
52. See Coppenbarger v. Federal Aviation Administration, 558 F.2d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
53. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 45. 
54. Face to face contact with the decisionmaker substantially enhances a welfare reci-
pient's chances. Id. at 43. 
55. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1276. 
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resource, monies transferred from the harried middle class to the economic-
ally disadvantaged. Maximized social welfare must pervade judicial pro-
cedural decisions; fine tuning individual decisions can do substantial harm if 
overall impact is ignored. 56 
In an exceedingly important and useful Seventh Circuit opinion, 
Hathaway v. Mathews, 57 Judge Swygert conducted a search for the right 
blend of fairness to the individual and furtherance of the general public 
good. The case involved a very loaded fact situation. The Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare58 terminated Medicaid benefits allocated for 
patients in Ms. Hathaway's nursing home because it found that the home did 
not comply with federal health and safety standards. Funds paid to her 
patients were cut off without first affording her notice and any sort of 
hearing. Apparently, the grievance asserted that the nursing home had no 
sprinkler system. 59 HEW never clarified that point even at oral argument. 60 
While the defect was discovered by an inspection team, the HEW inspectors 
did not inform Ms. Hathaway of the deficiency. Instead, HEW informed the 
state agency which in turn notified Ms. Hathaway. She contended that 
benefits to her patients could not be terminated without notice to her of 
specific violations and an opportunity to rebut HEW's allegation at a 
hearing. HEW's position was that even if a hearing must be held, it need not 
be a pre-termination hearing. On the procedural issue, the district court 
found that any due process requirement could be satisfied by the post-
termination hearing. 61 
The court of appeals held that as long as the home complied with state 
and federal requirements, Medicaid payments to its residents is a protected 
property right under the due process clause.62 The implications of this 
holding are that the health and safety requirements provide the government 
with the authority to discontinue its obligation on the one hand and provide 
the recipient with the basis for demanding some procedural protection on the 
other. Had entitlement to the benefits somehow been solely at the whim of 
the government, as in Roth and Bishop, perhaps no procedural protection 
56. Professor Mashaw offers an abstract value oriented system as the proper calculus for 
prescribing procedures in administrative adjudication. Mashaw, supra note 9, at 46-57. 
57. 546 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1976). 
58. Hereinafter referred to as HEW. 
59. See 546 F.2d at 231 n.4. 
60. Jd. at 230. 
61. /d. at 228. The district court also found that Hathaway could not seek a remedy 
against the federal agency because her relationship was with the state. The circuit court found 
that this argument exalted "legal formalism over reality." ld. at 229. It refused to ignore the 
fact that HEW's action would force her out of business. The circuit court also found that there 
were no state remedies to exhaust because the state was ready to pay the Medicaid benefits, but 
for the federal action. Id. at 229-30. 
62. ld. at 230. 
286 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 
would be available. The court confidently found that this situation fell 
within the "long line of cases"63 finding sufficient property interest to reach 
one protection of the due process clause, for the statute created an expecta-
tion which could not be withdrawn without notice and hearing. 64 The 
interest was of the variety for which a post-termination hearing was not 
sufficient protection: 
In determining whether a hearing must be afforded before a statu-
tory entitlement can be removed, we must balance the interests of 
the Government in protecting the health and safety of the Home's 
residents and the integrity of the Medicaid program against Hatha-
way's interests in not having the flow of Medicaid payments 
interrupted while she waits for her hearing. 
Where the deprivation to the individuals affected by the removal 
of a governmental benefit is this severe, the Government's assert-
ed interest must be pressing to justify postponing the hearing until 
after termination. 65 
The facts did not support the agency's contention that there was an 
imminent health and safety danger. After all, the court said, if there were a 
danger, why did the agency wait three months. 66 Thus, there were no time 
constraints compelling expediated termination. 
The fact situation in this case prohibits a result oriented procedural 
decision. The court was required to tread through several public policy 
dilemmas and its predicament here exemplifies the practical problem with 
procedural innovation in the area of informal adjudication. The rights of a 
nursing home operator had to be balanced against the ability of the govern-
ment to protect very helpless citizens. The need for pre-termination proce-
dure had to be balanced against the prospect that other nursing home 
operators will use the law to delay compliance with minimal standards, and 
to bargain insistence on burdensome procedures for compromise as to health 
and safety. 67 The cost of the procedures had to be weighed against the 
benefit which might accrue. Finally, the court had to remember that a 
pronouncement which might be fair in this individual case may make law 
which will be neither useful nor fair to the real interest to be protected: those 
63. See 546 F.2d at 230. 
64. Id. at 230-31. 
65. Id. (emphasis added). For criticism of the balancing approach see Note, Specifiying 
the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975). 
66. 546 F.2d at 231. 
67. See Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The 
Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1289-90 
(1972) (formal rule-making); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401, 443 (1975) (trial procedure 
for informal rule-making). 
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legitimately in need of Medicaid. The balance, the court decided, tipped in 
favor of some kind of hearing before termination. 
Since some sort of minimal level of procedural fairness had not been 
attained in Hathaway, the Seventh Circuit needed only to suggest tech-
niques which may have served. For this reason, the opinion is somewhat 
deficient as to the truly important question: what type of hearing is neces-
sary. The court seems to envision an evidentiary type hearing with an 
impartial fact finder. Yet, procedural fairness may have been attained 
merely by providing for an informal conference before termination. On this 
basis, it distinguished Case v. Weinberger68 where the termination was 
upheld because of such a pre-termination conference. The court suggested 
that mere notice might have avoided the entire controversy, and a statement 
of reasons accompanying proposed termination may have sufficed. 69 
Procedural Requirements for a Valid Hearing 
The crucial and difficult determination is what kind of procedure 
should be required for any given form of informal agency action. Myopic 
commitment to a trial-type hearing has stunted development in this area.70 
Greater flexibility in procedural alternatives should replace the definitional 
analysis requiring a choice between full trial procedures and no formal 
procedures for a hearing. Despite the Supreme Court's numerous admonish-
ments in favor of flexibility, 71 the commitment to procedural flexibility is 
largely illusory .72 
There is little excuse, except for simple traditionalism, for this lack of 
vision. Judge Friendly has provided an encyclopedic reference on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various elements of procedure.73 If judges 
could escape the strictures of the judicial model, they could use this tool to 
prescribe the elements of procedure which will serve a particular decision-
68. 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for 
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (where the Supreme Court found that a procedure 
which provided for preremoval conference at which counsel can object to removal). The 
interplay of rights-child's, parent's, foster parent's and community's-in the Smith case is 
exceedingly interesting. 
69. 546 F.2d at 231 n.4. The agency's failure to communicate its complaints in Hathaway 
stands in stark contrast with the agency's methods approach in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319 (1976). Mashaw, supra note 9, at 41. 
70. See Rabin, supra note 9, at 75. But see Mashaw, supra note 9, at 54. 
71. E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471,481 (1972). See generally Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Hannah v. Larche, 
363 u.s. 420 (1960). 
72. Rabin, supra note 9, at 75. 
73. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1277-1304. 
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making problem. Crafting new "tests" for imposing trial procedures is an 
unproductive, and often detrimental, game of legal semantics. 74 
In Goss v. Lopez, 75 the Supreme Court attempted to set forth realistic-
ally modeled procedures. That case involved a student who was suspended 
from public school for ten days without a hearing. Full trial, even very 
limited adversary processes, would have been inappropriate, counter-prod-
uctive and unduly expensive for all concerned. Yet, the Supreme Court 
would not permit irresponsible administrative action to stand merely for 
want of the imagination necessary to look beyond forensic methods. The 
Supreme Court said that school officials could not dismiss a student even for 
ten days without providing some process by which the decision could be 
tested. Even so minor a disciplinary action is not within absolute administra-
tive discretion. In defining what procedures are required, the Supreme Court 
showed sensitivity to the unique problems inherent in a school setting. 
Rather than requiring the school to follow a judicial model, the Court stated 
that the principal must provide the kind of process that a fair-minded 
principal would require under similar circumstances. 76 After articulating its 
concern for the practical problems of school discipline, the Court stated: 
[D]ue process requires . . . that the student be given oral or 
written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an 
explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportu-
nity to present his side of the story. The Clause requires at least 
these rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings 
of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school. 
In holding as we do, we do not believe that we have imposed 
procedures on school disciplinarians which are inappropriate in a 
classroom setting. Instead we have imposed requirements which 
are, if anything, less than a fair-minded school principal would 
impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions. 
Brief disciplinary suspensions are almost countless. To impose in 
each such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well 
overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by divert-
ing resources, cost more than it would save in educational effec-
tiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the suspension process 
... [may] destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching proc-
ess.n 
Consequently, the Supreme Court mitigated the dilemma of balancing the 
harm to the individual against detriment to functional effectiveness by 
74. Anxiety over keeping manageable the "right" to some kind of hearing rather than 
weighing the functional advantages of some procedures has driven the Supreme Court to set too 
high a threshold at which the right accrues. See Rabin, supra note 9, at 76. 
75. 419 u.s. 565 (1975). 
76. ld. at 583. 
77. ld. at 581-83 (emphasis added). 
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A conceptual base for determining what procedures are necessary rests 
on three elements: fairness, efficiency and satisfaction to participants.78 
These three values must interact. Where satisfaction to participants domi-
nates, as in Goldberg ,19 the process will be unduly cluttered with proce-
dures. Too much procedure can be as harmful as too little. 80 If efficiency 
dominates, procedures will be insufficient to assure accuracy and equity. 
Thus, what is needed is a methodology for applying the three values to 
evaluate particular cases. 81 
Each respective agency must have the initial choice to decide what type 
of hearing procedure would be most suitable for handling grievances in their 
area. Practical considerations, rather than judicial restraint, probably lead 
the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge to say: "In assessing what 
process is due in this case, substantial weight must be given to the good-
faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administra-
tion of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided 
assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals. " 82 The 
judicial duty is to supervise, not preempt. In doing so, the reviewing court 
must remember that it is dealing with "mass justice. " 83 
The needs of mass justice contradict the instinct for requiring every 
possible procedural safeguard in each individual case. Mass justice demands 
justice for all individuals in the system. While courts and commentators talk 
of the "government's interest," what they mean is the class' or general 
social welfare's interest. Balancing fairness against efficiency becomes 
serious business which cannot be resolved by a presumption in favor of the 
individual. The result of such insensitivity to community interests will be 
manifest injustice to perhaps millions of other individuals. 84 
78. Verkuii, supra note 7, at 740. "Fairness implies procedural justice; efficiency, op-
timum resource allocation; and satisfaction, participant trust in the process." ld. at 740 n.4. See 
also Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. 
REV. 585, 591-93 (1972). 
79. See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra. 
80. Concern for individual satisfaction in Social Security disability cases has undermined 
the whole system. Hearings on Delays in Social Security Appeals Before the House Ways and 
Means Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-39(1975); Mashaw, supra note 9, at 31 n.IO. Fora 
discussion of the effect of such laws on the Utah Schools see Marquardt & Plenck, School 
Suspension and the Right of Due Process: The Effect ofGoss and Wood in Utah Schools, 3 J. 
CoNTEMP. LAW 85 (1976). Judge Friendly points out that the English consider the whole 
development as one of over-judicialization of the administrative process. Friendly, supra note 
6, at 1269. 
81. Verkuil, supra note 7, at 740. 
82. 424 U.S. at 349. 
83. Verkuil, supra note 7, at 744. 
84. See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the 
Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1523-27 (1975). 
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Judge Friendly offers some guidance as to the hierarchy of seriousness 
to the individual which will be of assistance in balancing individual fairness 
against efficiency or group fairness. First, the actions may be divided 
between those which change an individual's existing status and those which 
deny a request for a benefit. The former represents a significantly higher 
level of seriousness to the individual. 85 He would then rank those actions 
falling into the change in status category in order of seriousness: (1) actions 
depriving an individual of liberty (e.g., parole revocation, civil commit-
ment, deportation); (2) revocation of professional licenses; (3) termination 
of public benefits (e.g., welfare, school, housing); and (4) reduction of 
those public benefits. 86 Efforts to rank particular classes of informal adjudi-
cation according to such interests will create understanding leading to 
awareness of the appropriate procedural ingredients. 87 
Ranking the individual seriousness according to this interest hierarchy 
offers some feeling for weighing the individual interest against that of the 
public's interest. This valuation can be used to choose among the elements 
of procedure. In evaluating the elements of procedure, Judge Friendly 
places highest value on three elements: notice, opportunity to comment and 
impartial decision-maker. 88 Notice, opportunity for at least written comment 
and reasons may be a minimum for informal adjudication. 89 However, some 
informal adjudication may not warrant even these exceedingly efficient 
procedures. While Judge Friendly states that "[g]ood sense would suggest 
that there must be some floor below which no hearing of any sort is 
required,' '90 rare will be the instance where reasoned explanation cannot 
and should not be provided by those exercising discretion. 91 At the very 
least, agencies should provide findings and reasons92 and open themselves 
to post-decision reconsideration.93 Judicial review should demand explana-
85. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1295-96. He cautioned that he does not intend by this 
distinction to resurrect the right/privilege doctrine. /d. at 1295. 
86. /d. at 1296-98. 
87. Verkuil, supra note 7, at 747. He suggests procedural rule-making to create a forum by 
which the agency could study the impact of its informal action. /d. at 747 n.31. 
88. See Friendly, supra note 6, at 1279-81. 
89. The "notice and comment" procedures of informal rule-making (5 U.S.C. § 553 
(1970)) may provide the core ingredients for all informal action. Verkuil, supra note 7, at 750. 
90. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1275. 
91. Rabin, supra note 9, at 79-80. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571 (1975); 
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402, 420 (1971). Cost and functional arguments which can be made against most proce-
dures are rarely valid for the modest procedure of reason explanation. Rabin, supra note 9, at 
89 n.98. 
92. In some cases, merely completed forms will suffice. 
93. See Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 633 (7th Cir. 1977). The fundamental due process 
right may be "a reasoned explanation of government conduct that is contrary to the expecta-
tions the government has created." Rabin, supra note 9, at 77. The opinion in Hathaway 
demonstrates how reasoned explanations can resolve issues efficiently. Hathaway v. Mathews, 
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tion as the starting point. 94 Nonetheless, the presumption should be strongly 
in favor of notice, comment and statement of findings and reasons. 
Judge Friendly believes an impartial decision-maker may solve many 
problems.95 No one can quarrel with this conclusion, but in the mass justice 
situation, there is no reason why the investigating officer himself will not be 
impartial. His job is to assure that the benefits go to the eligible.96 He does 
not have to pay the benefits, nor does his salary relate to whether benefits 
are paid or not. Of course, different officials will have different philosophies 
but mere separation of functions will not change that. The drive to go 
outside the agency for the decision-maker may reflect a commitment to 
appearance. The motivation of creating the appearance of fairness must not 
cloud procedural determination in informal adjudication. Appearances often 
come at too high a price. 
Two recent Seventh Circuit cases, Allen v. Weinberger97 and Coppen-
barger v. Federal Aviation Administration98 demonstrate an interesting 
contrast in approaches to the concept of the impartial decision-maker. In 
Allen, the court reviewed an HEW determination that the plaintiff was not 
eligible for disability insurance benefits. In reaching that decision, both the 
administrative law judge and the agency's Appeals Council based their 
decisions on the opinions of agency medical specialists who relied on the 
medical evidence in the record. The court virtually dismissed the opinions of 
two agency doctors who had not examined the claimant. Without the 
opinion of agency experts, the record contained only the favorable opinion 
of the treating physician and, hence, the record did not contain sufficient 
evidence to support the agency decision. The court correctly found that the 
opinions of two agency experts, based only on the medical reports, were not 
inadmissible hearsay. 99 Instead, it found that the opinions of the agency 
experts must be disregarded for want of firsthand knowledge and that the 
only reliable opinion was that of the treating physician even though he was 
very likely to be biased. The court's mistake lay in classifying the opinions 
of the agency experts as "evidence;" whereas, in fact, the experts' partici-
546 F.2d at 231 n.4 (7th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of Hathaway see text accompanying notes 
57-69 supra. 
94. Professor Rabin suggests a "limited standard of judicial review, providing an ag-
grieved individual with a judicial remedy when the agency fails to supply an explanation for its 
decision that indicates clearly and in detail why the adverse determination has been reached." 
Rabin, supra note 9, at 85. 
95. See Friendly, supra note 6, at 1279. 
96. See Verkuil, supra note 7, at 755. The adversary process is not preferred where 
interests correspond, standards are clear and both sides see the value of efficiency. ld. at 754-
56. 
97. 552 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1977). 
98. 558 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977). 
99. 552 F.2d at 786. 
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pation was part of the decision-making process not part of the information 
gathering process. 
In Coppenbarger, a different panel refused to disapprove of the Feder-
al Aviation Administration's use of expert opinion which was not properly 
introduced into evidence. The agency had denied a pilot certificate for 
medical reasons. In doing so, the agency relied on the opinion of unnamed 
consultants in neurology to evaluate the medical reports. The court found 
that this expert opinion need not be presented as evidence and the experts 
need not be made available for cross-examination: "[T)he Administrator's 
purpose in retaining the experts was merely to obtain their help in evaluating 
the data which petitioner had supplied. The Administrator was entitled to do 
this, and petitioner had no more right to cross-examine the experts than he 
had to cross-examine the Administrator himself. " 100 Not only does the 
approach in Coppenbarger seem more consistent with the Supreme Court's 
pronouncement in the leading case of Richardson v. Perales 101 but it 
evidences an understanding of decision-making in the administrative proc-
ess. No one administrative official can obtain the knowledge which is 
imputed to agency decision-makers as "expertise." Rather, in order to fill 
the need for expertise, the administrative process permits the decision-
maker to freely make use of various experts. By doing so, an official has not 
consulted extra-record evidence but rather has taken the necessary expert 
into the decision-making process. Thus, as the Coppenbarger panel sug-
gests, the experts and the presiding officials become interrelated parts of the 
decision-making process. Of course, both must be impartial but the tech-
niques for assuring impartiality are not necessarily the same as those used in 
a trial to test witnesses. 
Judge Friendly would rank such testimonial devices as the right to 
know opposing evidence, to call witnesses, 102 to cross-examine and to be 
represented by counsel103 at a much lower level than impartial decision-
making.104 He would shift the emphasis to what he calls the "investigatory" 
100. 558 F.2d at 840. 
101. 402 U.S. 389, 408 (1971). In Perales, the Court held that written reports by physicians 
constituted substantial evidence notwithstanding the reports' hearsay character, the absence of 
cross-examination and the directly opposing testimony. The Court held that due process had 
not been violated. Id. at 402. 
102. In Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit recognized 
substantial limits on the right to call witnesses in informal administrative proceedings. Nonethe-
less, the court found that "[d]ue process does not permit the automatic exclusion of the right to 
call witnesses." Id. 
103. An empirical study appears to value this element more highly. Verkuil, supra note 7, 
at 750 (citing W. Popkin, REPORT FOR THE COMMITTEE ON GRANT AND BENEFIT PROGRAMS OF 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 27, 1975 (unpublished final 
draft)). 
104. See Friendly, supra note 6, at 1278-91. 
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model 105-scientific fact finding or information gathering. Impartial investi-
gation might replace adversary methods. The investigatory process would 
give the government officials power to inquire into the facts without limiting 
the method of inquiry to the dialectic. Certainly, the best approach is not to 
begin with full trial procedures and subtract certain elements. The best 
approach is to begin with a minimum, perhaps notice, written comment and 
statement of findings and reason, and add procedures. 106 Accuracy and 
sensitivity to the relevant class must be the goals of the informal action. 107 
Damage Liability for Denial of Due Process 
Recently, the choice of an appropriate remedy has become complicated 
by new law creating damage liability for due process violations. The sole 
question in the Seventh Circuit case of Piphus v. Carey 108 was damage 
liability. The case involved the twenty-day suspension of two public school 
students. The district court found that the suspensions were ordered without 
a hearing in violation of due process but ordered neither damages nor 
equitable relief. The finding of due process violation was not raised on 
appeal and, hence, the court of appeals had to decide only whether damages 
could be assessed against either the individuals or the institution responsible 
for deprivation without minimal due process. 109 Traditionally, the remedies 
for this kind of due process violation are declaratory orders or injunctions. 
However, the Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland110 opened the door to 
damage liability. Since that case, the Seventh Circuit has been a force in the 
development of the law. 
Wood v. Strickland involved expulsion of three Arkansas high school 
students for "spiking" punch. The suspension decision was made by the 
school board at a meeting. The students were not present at the meeting nor 
were they permitted any means of defending themselves. They brought a 
section 1983 action 111 claiming that their federal constitutional rights to due 
process were infringed under color of state law. The amended complaints 
asked not only for injunctive relief but also for compensatory and punitive 
damages against the members of the school board, two school adminis-
105. Compare Friendly, supra note 6, at 1289-90 with Mashaw, supra note 9, at 53-54. 
106. Gardner, supra note 8, at 163-64. 
107. The case of Young v. Brashears, 560 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1977), suggests an approach 
to choosing the proper informal procedure. The case involved the removal of Dr. Quentin 
Young as Clinical Director of the Department of Medicine at Cook County Hospital. After 
finding entitlement which gave rise to a due process requirement of some kind of hearing, the 
district court asked the parties to suggest just what elements of procedures were required in this 
instance. The appellate court seemed to approve. 
108. 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4224 (Mar. 21, 1978) (76-1149). 
109. /d. at 31. 
110. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). See generally Marquardt & Plenck, supra note 80. 
Ill. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 
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trators, and the school district. The major part of the opm10n concerns 
official immunity from section 1983 actions. The Supreme Court refused to 
recognize absolute immunity for school officials. It did, however, find that 
official discretionary actions were entitled to qualified, good faith immunity 
from liability for damages. The Supreme Court expressed concern ·that the 
threat of money damages would inhibit the school officials from furthering 
educational needs and discourage competent people from entering school 
administration. It found that absolute immunity was not necessary to assure 
against these evils and "would deny much of the promise of section 
1983. " 112 School administrators could be held to "a standard of conduct 
based not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the 
basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges ... .'' 113 The 
Court stated: 
[I]n the specific context of school discipline, we hold that a school 
board member is not immune from liability for damages under § 
1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action 
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate 
the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the 
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of 
constitutional rights or other injury to the student.l 14 
The Supreme Court conceded the emerging nature of the law with its caution 
that school officials cannot be held to predict the future course of constitu-
tional law. 
In Piphus, 115 the district court found that the first test of Strickland was 
met because the school officials "should have known that a lengthy suspen-
sion without any adjudicative hearing of any type would violate the constitu-
tional rights of plaintiffs.'' 116 The key question, therefore, was not whether 
defendant officials were technically liable for damages but whether any 
damages could be proved. The district court found no proof of actual 
damages. The court of appeals found that non-punitive damages are recover-
able for a violation of due process even if there is no proof of either 
individual injury or pecuniary loss. The amount will depend on the nature of 
the wrong. Thus, plaintiffs may be entitled to damages for deprivation of 
due process rights even where no individual injury is shown and to special 
damages based on the value of school days lost. But damages based on the 
suspension itself may not be imposed if defendants can show that the 
112. 420 U.S. at 322. 
113. Id. 
114. I d. The Court relied generally on Sheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). In the 
context of the Kent State killings, the court refused to find absolute official immunity. 416 U.S. 
at 238-49. 
115. 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4224 (Mar. 21, 1978) (76-1149). 
116. Id. at 31 n.2. 
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plaintiffs would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had been 
held. 117 
In Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 118 Judge Tone 
had constructed a firm foundation for the proposition that failure to provide 
necessary due process might give rise to damages unrelated to the possible 
outcome of the hearing. 119 This leading case for due process-related-dam-
ages involved alleged wrongful termination of the employment of a former 
president of a public junior college. The Seventh Circuit held that he should 
have been afforded a hearing and, hence, was entitled to damages against 
the Board but not the individual members. The court found that the plaintiff 
had a legitimate claim of entitlement which could not be denied without a 
hearing because the Board's regulations "in fact" established a tenure 
policy. 120 The circuit court did not subject the individual members to 
damage liability because it found them protected by official immunity .121 
With respect to the Board as an institution, however, the court held that 
damages were appropriate. 122 The court agreed that plaintiff would have 
been terminated after a full hearing, but found that plaintiff was nonetheless 
entitled to damages for violations of due process rights. 123 The court granted 
"recovery of non-punitive damages for the deprivation of intangible rights 
for which no pecuniary loss can be shown. " 124 The factors to be considered 
in measuring such ephemeral damages include ''the nature of the constitu-
tional deprivation and the magnitude of the mental distress and humiliation 
suffered by the plaintiff." 125 
When an Agency May Choose Informal Adjudication 
While judicially created law may mandate some formalized procedures 
in informal adjudication, statutory language settles the question of whether 
the agency is free to proceed by informal procedures. In United States Steel 
Corp. v. Train, 126 the Seventh Circuit was forced to determine when, in the 
absence of clear statutory mandate, an agency must proceed by formal trial-
117. ld. at 32. Equitable relief, declaratory and injunctive, should not depend on whether 
plaintiffs would have been suspended in any event. 
118. 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976). 
119. ld. at 579. 
120. ld. at 575-76. 
121. ld. at 578. 
122. ld. at 577. The government, rather than employees, should be liable. The victim of 
official misconduct will be compensated without making government officials even more timid. 
DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 597. 
123. 523 F.2d at 579. 
124. ld. 
125. ld. at 580. 
126. 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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type adjudicatory procedures. The case arose from the steel company's 
challenge to the conditions placed on a discharge permit granted by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency. 127 The bulk of the case 
involves complicated questions of fact and several other procedural is-
sues. 128 The major administrative procedural issue was whether section 554 
of the Administrative Procedure Act 129 required formal adjudicatory proce-
dures. 
The APA prescribes formal procedure, for both rule-making and ad-
judication, where either is ''required by statute to be determined on the 
record after opportunity for an agency hearing. '' 130 The key phrase is not the 
requirement of agency hearing but that the statute requires the decision to be 
made "on the record." The term "hearing" in administrative law has a 
myriad of meanings from full trial to mere written comment. 131 Thus, 
Congress does not necessarily intend to require trial-type procedures merely 
by providing for a "hearing" or even a "full hearing." 
Strict construction of the phrase "on the record after opportunity for an 
agency hearing" 132 in rule-making proceedings was suggested by the Su-
preme Court opinion in United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. 133 That 
case involved the language of section 1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce 
Act134 which stated that "[t]he Commission may, after hearing . . . estab-
lish reasonable rules. " 135 The Court held that this language was not suffi-
cient to compel trial-type rule-making. The Court read the activating lan-
guage in section 553 of the APA136 very strictly in reliance on its prior 
opinion in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp. 137 While conced-
ing that words other than ''required by statute to be determined on the record 
after opportunity for an agency hearing" may activate the formal procedural 
requirement, the Court left little room for variation in language. 
127. Hereinafter referred to as the EPA. 
128. The court found that because the Company was the proponent of the permit order, it 
could be required to bear the burden under 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970). And because 5 U.S.C. § 
554(d)(A) (1970) exempts "applications for initial licenses" from 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970) and 5 
U.S.C. § 557(b)(1970), the hearing officer may certify the record without rendering an initial 
decision. 556 F.2d at 834. 
129. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). [Hereinafter the Administrative Procedure Act will be referred 
to as the APA]. 
130. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970) (rule-making); 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970) (adjudication). 
131. Friendly, supra note 6, at 1270; but see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 157 n.l 
(3d ed. 1972) and DAVIS SUPP. 1970, supra note 2, at § 7.01. 
132. 5 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1970). 
133. 410 u.s. 224 (1973). 
134. 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1970). 
135. ld. 
136. 5 u.s.c. § 553 (1970). 
137. 406 u.s. 742 (1972). 
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However, in Florida East Coast Ry. , the Supreme Court drew a 
distinction between rule-making and adjudication. The railroads argued, 
relying on Morgan and Louisville, 138 that the words "hearing" or "full 
hearing" compelled the trial procedures as surely as the words contained in 
the APA. The Supreme Court found that these cases applied only to "quasi-
judicial" proceedings, i.e. formal adjudicative determinations, and not to 
rule-making. 139 Adjudication, it implied, might be treated differently and 
the strict construction given the key phrase may not be appropriate in an 
adjudicative context. 140 
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Train that a formal proceeding was 
required141 seems consistent with the approach of treating adjudication 
differently than rule-making that was suggested by the Supreme Court. In 
Train, the court was required to decide whether formal procedures were 
necessary in an adjudicative setting. The statute in question provided that 
''the Administrator may, after opportunity for public hearing, issue a permit 
for the discharge of any pollutant . . . '' 142 and did not contain the words 
"on the record." The court felt that the absence of the words "on the 
record" was not conclusive and, hence, it went behind the language in order 
to determine the full extent of the hearing provision. It was troubled by the 
fact that Congress had used the magic words in other sections of the statute. 
This fact suggests that Congress knew how to provide for formal hearing 
when it was so inclined. 143 However, it found this statutory construction 
consideration outweighed by its finding of congressional intent. 144 
The court found some support for requiring formal adjudicative proce-
dures in the provision for judicial review. Little force can be given to the 
court's concern for judicial review, however, because the provision for 
judicial review does not necessarily require any particular kind of record-
making procedures. 145 Certainly, it does not require a formal record 
compiled through formal adjudication. Courts can, and have, in fact, 
conducted review on a "written record" which was not a formal, eviden-
tiary record. 146 
138. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) (Morgan II); ICC v. Louisville & Nashville 
Ry. Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913). 
139. Contra, Nathanson, Probing the Minds of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and 
Standards of Judical Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal 
Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 721, 731-33 (1975). (Professor Nathanson reads the legislative 
history of the APA, in light of these two cases, as supporting the railroad's position). 
140. 410 U.S. at 244-45. 
141. 556 F.2d at 836-37. 
142. 33 U .S.C. § 1342(a)(l) (Supp. II 1972). 
143. 556 F.2d at 833. 
144. ld. 
145. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-42 (1973). 
146. E.g., United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). 
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The court primarily relied on a close, common sense reading of section 
509 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 147 That section sug.gests that 
Congress did not intend to provide for disparate forms of adjudication. 
Subsection (c) provides for review of "any judicial proceeding brought 
under subsection (b) of this section," which must be made "on the 
record. " 148 Since both section 402 of the FWPCA, 149 the section at issue, 
and section 307 of the FWPCA, 150 which contains "on the record" lan-
guage, are listed in subsection (b), both must be covered by the "on the 
record" language which activates APA section 554151 formal procedures if 
disparate forms of adjudication are to be avoided. 
As an additional argument, the Seventh Circuit supported its conclu-
sion by looking to the scope of review. The court found that licensing 
decisions such as the one at issue require APA sections 556152 and 557153 
procedures and hence APA section 706(2)(E)154 imposed "substantial evi-
dence" review. Substantial evidence review must by definition be made on 
a formal record: evidentiary review is impossible on an informal record 
because there is no evidence. 155 Thus, the imposition of ''substantive 
evidence" review requires formal adjudication in order to build the eviden-
tiary record which will permit the court to conduct such review. 156 
These semantic conclusions, however, probably were not the motivat-
ing force behind the decision. The court leaned in this direction basically 
because it was confronted with adjudication, not some other agency action 
such as rule-making where the traditional mode of proceeding is not trial. 
Trial-type procedures seemed appropriate where adjudication was involved. 
The court also examined the practical impact trial-type procedures 
would have on the EPA's ability to protect the environment. 157 The court 
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. II 1972) [hereinafter referred to as FWPCA]. 
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. II 1972). 
149. 33 U .S.C. § 1342 (Supp. II 1972). 
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1974). 
151. 5 u.s.c. § 554 (1970). 
152. 5 u.s.c. § 556 (1970). 
153. 5 u.s.c. § 557 (1970). 
154. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970) provides in part: 
The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and 
conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to 
sections 556 and 557 of this title [5] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency 
hearing provided by statute. 
155. Of course, review is possible under arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion 
standards. Where the adjudicative procedure will not result in an adequate record, the court 
may conduct de novo review. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 
(1971). 
156. For a full development of this logic see Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1249-63 
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (the court used similar analysis to require some trial procedures even where 
formal rule-making was prescribed by statute). 
157. 556 F.2d at 834. 
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concluded that although trial procedures in all permit situations would 
render the process practically impossible, the few instances in which a 
hearing is actually requested is not beyond the practical limit. Implicit in this 
examination, however, is the court's insistence on weighing the practical 
implications, at least where the congressional mandate of formal procedures 
is unclear, before compelling such procedure. 
CONSISTENCY AS A LIMIT ON DISCRETION 
Another way to confine discretion is to force agencies either to be 
consistent158 or to explain why they are not. The question of consistency 
most often arises in the context of both adjudicatively created precedent and 
agency commitment to its own rules. 
Consistency in informal adjudicative decisions is an important factor in 
the fairness of those decisions. Nonetheless, compelling an agency to be 
consistent in their adjudicative decisions will not always result in fairness 
and justice, especially where discretion is intentionally delegated. Some-
times individualizing requires that the agency deviate from precedent. 159 
Moreover, practicality rules out a system whereby the decision-makers must 
be consistent with massive numbers of rulings. 160 In mass justice systems, 
keeping current with all of the millions of agency rulings is impossible. 
Consequently, courts cannot require complete consistency and must tolerate 
some, perhaps much, inconsistency, but courts can require "(a) that ad-
ministrators must strive for consistency, (b) that they must consider their 
own precedents when doing so is feasible, and (c) that when administrators 
depart from their own precedents they must normally explain why they 
do. • ' 161 The latter is the most important concept. While fairness often 
requires individualizing rather than consistency, the agency should formu-
late and disclose the reason for inconsistency. 
In Hilt Truck Line, Inc. v. United States, 162 the Seventh Circuit 
rejected the agency decision because the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion163 deviated from a long series of agency precedent. The case involved 
an appeal from the ICC's restriction on authorized operating rights pur-
chased from another carrier. The ICC found that dormancy, or failure to 
provide service, withdrew operating authority in some counties in Illinois, 
158. K. DAVIS, supra note I, at 106-07 (1969); See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (1921). But see L. Jaffe, JUDICAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
586-87 (1965). 
159. K. DAVIS, supra note I, at 21, 107; see Sofaer, supra note 4, at 1354. 
160. Sofaer, supra note 4, at 1353-54. 
161. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 412. 
162. 548 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1977). 
163. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the ICC or the Commission. 
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ignoring prior decisions in which the Commission had consistently held that 
harm to protesting carriers is a necessary prerequisite to a finding of 
dormancy. 164 Since the Commission adopted the Administrative Law 
Judge's 165 finding of an absence of harm, the court held that "[t]he 
Commission cannot disregard its own precedents but must reasonably ex-
plain an alternation [sic] of policy." 166 The court confined discretion by 
requmng uniformity unless sound reasons for modification are 
articulated. 167 
Although courts will give great deference to an agency's interpretation 
of its own rules, 168 they will not permit an agency to fail to follow its 
rules, 169 at least without giving reasons for doing so. Here also, justice may 
demand that an agency should individualize rather than blindly follow its 
own rules. As in adjudication, fairness compels a balance between consis-
tency and individualizing. 
The Seventh Circuit, in Cox v. Benson, 170 carefully examined whether 
the parole rules should apply to petitioners. Petitioner sought habeas corpus · 
in the district court to question denial of parole by the parole board's 
national appellate board. He claimed that the board failed to follow its own 
regulation and applied the regulation in violation of due process. The 
appellate board on its own motion had reversed the examiner's favorable 
decision and denied parole. The board's action was based on a guideline 
provision which, due to the severity of the offense, placed petitioner in the 
highest category of punishment. Petitioner argued that the guidelines were · 
arbitrarily applied to him. He received a favorable case worker report on his 
fitness to re-enter society arid he had not been given an opportunity to refute 
the unproven facts under which he was characterized. The court held that the 
board arbitrarily applied the guidelines to petitioner. The court found sup-
port for this decision in the board's failure to proceed according to its own 
procedural regulation. 171 
164. 548 F.2d at 215. 
165. Hereinafter referred to as the ALJ. 
166. 548 F.2d at 216 (citing both Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) arid National Ass'n of Food Chains, Inc. v. 
ICC, 535 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
167. See Friendly, Judicial Control of Discretionary Administrative Action, 23 J. LEGAL 
Eo. 63, 65 (1970). 
168. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 16 (1%5). But see FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 
726, 745 (1973); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Ford Motor Co., 390 U.S. 261, 272, 
modified on other grounds, 392 U.S. 901 (1968). 
169. United States v. Pennsylvania Ind. Chern. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 673-75 (1973); Vitarelli 
v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363,373-76 (1957); United 
States ex ret. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-68 (1954). See generally Berger, Do 
Regulations Really Bind Regulators?, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 137 (1%7). 
170. 548 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1977). 
171. /d. at 189. Judge Fairchild was more receptive to the Board's discretion to deny parole 
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In another denial of parole based on severity of the offense, Garcia v. 
United States Board of Parole, 172 the petitioner challenged application of 
the rule. Garcia pleaded guilty to charges stemming from his involvement in 
the bombing of several retail shops in Chicago. He was denied parole based 
on the Board's guidelines. The severity of the offense led the Board to find 
that his release would depreciate the gravity of the offense and would be 
incompatible with the welfare of society. At the first review, the district 
court ordered a new parole hearing because the Board's reasons were not 
specific enough. 173 In this second consideration, the district court granted 
habeas corpus, finding the reasons still insufficient. The Seventh Circuit 
reversed and remanded. 174 It recognized that minimum due process included 
a statement of reasons for denying parole. To be acceptable in parole cases, 
reasons must be sufficient for review; detailed findings of facts are not 
required so long as the reasons evidence consideration of all relevant factors 
and furnish essential facts and the grounds for the decision. The board is not 
required to issue an opinion supporting its decision. 175 The court found that 
the reasons here met this standard. It noted that, although the board applied 
the guidelines, it did not do so blindly. The court was convinced that the 
Board undertook sufficient consideration of individual circumstances. The 
board considered the actual gravity of the offense and did not resort to mere 
definitional application of the language of the guidelines. 176 
An agency's interpretation or application cannot bend the language of 
its regulation beyond natural meaning. In Amoco Oil Co. v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Commission, 177 the court considered an attempt by 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission to include peti-
tioner's shop storage dispensing tank under a regulation for "service sta-
tions." The court needed only to consult ordinary dictionaries in finding that 
the interpretation strained beyond the breaking point. It found that the 
Commission could have prohibited the petitioner's above ground dispensing 
tank, but it did not do so. 178 An agency cannot cover its mistakes by 
misinterpreting the language of its guidelines. 
CONFINING DISCRETION THROUGH REQUIRED RULE-MAKING 
The Seventh Circuit was one of the first in the federal judiciary to 
"based on the egregious nature of the offense." Id. at 192. He concurred in requiring the Board 
to find the necessary facts in exercising that discretion. ld. 
172. 557 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1977). 
173. 409 F. Supp. 1230, 1239-40 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
174. 557 F.2d at 107. 
175. Id. at 105. 
176. Id. at 106. 
177. 549 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1976). 
178. Id. at 2. 
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recognize the utility of judicially required rule-making as a technique for 
confining administrative discretion. Recently, in Mandley v. Trainor, 179 the 
circuit gave further impetus to the concept of judicially required rule-
making.180 
The foundation case for judicially required rule-making, Holmes v. 
New York City Housing Authority, 181 held that the City Housing Authority 
must allocate scarce public housing in accordance with "ascertainable 
standards." 182 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Soglin v. Kauffman 183 
found the absence of adequate administrative standards fatal to administra-
tive action. 184 Other Seventh Circuit opinions evidence recognition of the 
potential for judicially required rule-making as a device for confining 
discretion. 185 
This concept of judicially required rule-making is gaining acceptance 
throughout the federal court system and in some states. 186 Its most ardent 
promoter has been Professor Kenneth Davis. The concept largely emanates 
from Professor Davis' seminal work on discretionary justice187 and has been 
nurtured by him ever since. 188 Professor Davis offers a choice of four 
rationales which can support a judicial mandate of rule-making. 189 The first 
is the due process technique suggested by the Holmes and Soglin deci-
sions. 190 The second reformulates and revitalizes the discredited nondelega-
tion doctrine. 191 The third uses the ''void for vagueness'' doctrine to suggest 
that administrative action may be saved even if based on a vague statute if 
agency regulation adequately fills in the detail. 192 The fourth simply looks to 
the common law process to develop judicially created law compelling rule-
making in certain situations. 193 Professor Davis prefers the last rationale194 
179. 545 F.2d \062 (7th Cir. 1976). 
\80. See text accompanying notes 218-23 infra. 
181. 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968). 
182. Id. 
183. 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). 
184. Id. at \68. 
185. See, e.g., Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1974). 
\86. The Administrative Conference has long looked to rule-making as a technique for 
limiting discretion. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION I C.F.R. § 305.71-3 
(1977); Gardner, supra note 8, at 159. 
187. DAVIS, supra note I. Closely related points were made in Judge Friendly's lectures on 
the Holmes case. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Defini-
tion of Standards pts. 1-3, 75 HARV. L. REv. 863, \055, \263 (1962). 
188. See DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at§§ 2.00-2.04, 2.17, 4.00-4.20, 6.\3, \7 .07; DAVIS 
SuPP. 1970, supra note 2, at§§ 1.04-8, 1.04-13, 4.13-22; Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 
36 u. CHI. L. REV. 713 (1969). 
189. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at§ 6.13. See also Clagett, supra note 3, at 64-65 
(discussing the rationales for judicially required rule-making). 
\90. See text accompanying notes 195-97 infra. 
\91. See text accompanying notes \99-206 infra. 
192. See text accompanying notes 207-08 infra. 
\93. See text accompanying notes 209-16 infra. 
\94. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at§ 6.\3-1. 
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and the Seventh Circuit opinion in Mandley v. Trainor is another step in the 
development of such law in the Seventh Circuit. 
The penumbral due process doctrine is the first of the constitutional 
notions which will support required rule-making. Professor Davis, 195 sup-
ported by Judge J. Skelly Wright, 196 suggests that due process might require 
rule-making in some situations. Judge Wright argues that due process 
includes the right to have one's conduct judged by known standards; without 
standards there is no law. 197 This is the theory of the leading Holmes 
case. 198 
The second rationale for required rule-making, the non-delegation 
doctrine, also looks to the evils of standardless power-power without 
boundaries. This fear has always supported the non-delegation doctrine. 
Briefly, the non-delegation doctrine questions the legality of delegation of 
"legislative" authority to the executive branch or administrative agencies. 
The practical weakness of the doctrine led to retreat from absolute prohibi-
tion against the delegation of ''legislative'' functions. 199 The first step in the 
retreat was to permit such delegation with clear standards. The practical 
impossibility of precise legislative standards led to gradual acceptance of 
vague, general standards. At present, the vitality of the requirement of 
legislative standards is questionable. Under current theory, the permissible 
limits of delegation are very broad. 200 By 1970, Professor Davis was 
prepared to say that "[t]he non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete 
failure . . . . The time has come for the courts to acknowledge that the 
. . . doctrine is unsatisfactory and to invent better ways to protect against 
arbitrary administrative power. " 201 
195. DAVIS SUPP. 1970, supra note 2, at§ 2.00-6; DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at§ 6.13. 
196. Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 588 (1972). 
197. /d. at 588-89. 
198. 398 F.2d at 265. In that case, the Fifth Circuit was driven toward a due process 
requirement of administrative standards because it feared that power without standards to 
govern its exercise is "an intolerable invitation to abuse." ld. The court recognized that there 
was not enough public housing to satisfy all eligible applicants and, hence, that agency 
compliance with its statutory mandate was physically impossible. The court had to fashion a 
remedy which complied with due process and yet solved the difficult problem of choosing who 
would be favored among eligible applicants. The only remedy which made sense involved 
forcing the agency to allocate the scarce housing by some unbiased process. To solve this 
practical problem, the court required the agency to articulate the standards by which it would 
dispense housing. 
199. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
200. Leventhal, Principled Fairness and Regulatory Urgency, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 66, 
70 (1974). 
201. DAVIS SuPP. 1970, supra note 2, at § 2.00. Contra, Wright, supra note 196, at 582 
("the reported demise of the delegation doctrine is a bit premature."). The Seventh Circuit in 
Penn-Dixie Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 553·F.2d 1078 (7th 
Cir. 1977) found that Congress could delgate adjudicative authority in cases regarding OSHA 
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One of the "better ways" is required rule-making. To require rule-
making, the non-delegation doctrine need only be "reformulated. " 202 
Though standards will be required, the standards can be provided by the 
agency. Rather than striking down legislation which has insufficient stan-
dards, the doctrine will be used to compel agencies to fill in the details with 
more definite standards. 203 Indeed, administrative standards may often be 
preferable to legislative standards. 204 
This rationale has two fundamental weaknesses, one practical and the 
other theoretical. 205 The practical weakness stems from the potential danger 
that rigid application of this abstract principle will eliminate necessary 
flexibility. The theoretical weakness runs from the general principle that if 
Congress, under the doctrine of separation of powers, cannot delegate 
legislative functions, then nothing the agency does can save the unconstitu-
tional delegation. 206 Neither of these weaknesses is compelling. As long as 
the need for discretion is recognized, the required standards will leave room 
for individualizing and, since the doctrine is a judicial creation, its theoretic-
al parameters can be changed by the courts. 
The third rationale looks to the general prohibition against vagueness. 
Required rule-making offers an alternative to striking down a statute as too 
vague; required rule-making may be used to force the responsible agency to 
give definition to overtly vague statutory provisions. Professor Davis 
contends that the Supreme Court suggests this idea in Papachristou v. 
Jacksonville. 207 If the vagueness is impermissible because it permits and 
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law, then the 
remedy need not be so drastic as to void the statute.208 
Of the four rationales, common law development offers the simplest 
and most straight-forward support for required rule-making. The above 
three rationales emanate from constitutional interpretations. While the 
Constitution structures our law, it is not the primary source of movement in 
violation even though penalties were involved. The question of standards was not mentioned. 
Relying on Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 1261 
(1977) the court found that the seventh amendment did not require trial by jury in such penalty 
adjudication. 553 F.2d at 1080-81. 
202. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 224-25. 
203. Thomforde, Controlling Administrative Sanctions, 74 MICH. L. REv. 709, 736-37 
(1976). 
204. DAVIS SUPP. 1970, supra note 2, at§§ 4.14-4.17. 
205. Thomforde, supra note 203, at 736-38. 
206. Professor Sofaer suggests the opposite as a theoretical objection to required rule-
making. If the legislature delegates discretion, the agency cannot avoid the delegation by 
establishing rules. Sofaer, supra note 3, at 1319-31. 
207. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
208. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 24-25. Other than to support required rule-making, 
"void for vagueness" offers little promise in inhibiting virtually unlimited grants of discretion 
in noncriminal matters. Clagett, supra note 4, at 55 n.7. 
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the law. Our system depends on judicial development. Too often, in recent 
times, we ignore common law development as support for new legal 
concepts. Everything need not start with a constitutional base. 209 Greater 
flexibility and greater opportunity for experimentation result from the evolu-
tionary, common law process. 
The most influentiill case leading to such common law development is 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus. 210 The Court held: 
"Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself 
will confine and control the exercise of discretion. Courts should require 
administrative officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern 
their discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible.' ' 211 The Environ-
mental Defense Fund, an organization engaged in activities related to 
environmental protection, asked for suspension of registration for any pes-
ticides using DDT. The opinion suggested that, although discretionary 
power was vested in the agency, its exercise was reviewable for abuse of 
discretion under section 706(2)(A) of the APA. 212 One of the ways abuse of 
discretion review can confine and control delegated discretion is by compel-
ling administrative officers to articulate standards. 
While serving on the Seventh Circuit appellate panel, Justice Stevens 
made a valuable contribution to the common law evolution of required rule-
making. 213 The views of then Judge Stevens were expressed in a dissent 
from a remand in Morales v. Schmidt. 214 The majority found the key 
question to be whether the prison's limitation on prisoners' rights to corre-
spond was related to a legitimate rehabilitation purpose. Judge Stevens 
noted that the prohibition was not supported by a regulation, and would 
place a heavier burden of justification in the case of ad hoc determinations 
"[i]n view of the risks of error inherent in an ad hoc determination, 
unsupported either by preformulated guidelines or by a more complete 
exposition of the reasons why less drastic alternatives could not be equally 
effective . . . . " 215 Thus, especially where individual rights are in danger, 
an agency should by rules define the exercise of its discretion. Where it can 
do so but does not, it increases its burden of persuasion in explaining its ad 
hoc discretionary action. 216 Judicial review can thereby add incentive for 
209. See Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 283 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 
D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,470-72 (1942) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); accord, Friendly, supra note 6, at 1301-02. 
210. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
211. /d. at 598. 
212. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). 
213. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 226-27. 
214. 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973). 
215. Id. at 1349. 
216. As Professor Davis points out, the requirement of findings and reasons is interlocked 
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agencies to make rules which confine their discretion. 
The more often those challenging agency action ask the court to require 
rules and the more often the courts reject the exercise of discretion without 
standards, the more the law will evolve. Already numerous courts have 
utilized this remedy. 217 One such case is the Seventh Circuit's decision in 
Mandley v. Trainor. 218 That case involved a second review of the Illinois 
implementation of the Emergency Assistance Program. 219 Part of the pro-
posed final judgment ordered HEW to file a regulation with the district 
court. HEW contended that the district court could not order the adoption of 
a particular rule. The Seventh Circuit found that the promulgation of rules 
implementing the Social Security Act is mandatory. 22° Consequently, the 
court found that the ordered rule-making was consistent with legislative 
intent. 
Perhaps, the court put too much emphasis on statutory construction. 
Statutory language should not be read to compel agencies to proceed first by 
rule-making before it can take other appropriate action. 221 Agencies must 
have the discretion to choose how to attack a regulatory problem. While the 
discretion should not be unbridled, the propriety of the discretionary choice 
must be judged according to the needs of specific situations and not statutory 
construction. Only the cleanest legislative intention to narrow the method of 
proceeding should compel a court to narrow such discretion solely upon the 
statutory language. Nonetheless, a court should require rule-making where 
circumstances surrounding a specific regulatory problem demand such ac-
tion. Under the circumstances of Mandley, the agency should have used 
rule-making and the district court quite properly required it to do so. 
Mandley continues the line of cases establishing required rule-making as an 
appropriate remedy in the Seventh Circuit. 222 
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the HEW that a district court could not 
with the requirement of rules. The requirement of reasons is itself a valuable tool for confining 
and controlling discretion. See text accompanying notes 187-94 supra. 
2I7. DAVIS SEVENTIES, supra note 2, at 227-29. Even the alleged absolute discretion of 
prosecutors and police may be confined by administrative rule-making. E.g., McGowan, Rule-
making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972); Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. I (197I); K. DAVIS, supra note I, at 
162-2I4. 
2I8. 545 F.2d I062 (7th Cir. 1976). 
2I9. Mandley v. Trainor, 523 F.2d 4I5 (7th Cir. 1975). 
220. 545 F.2d at 1072 (citing Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 
663 (2nd Cir. I973)). 
221. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 4I6 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 
u.s. 194, 201-02 (1974). 
222. The case of Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Bd., I6 Ill. App. 3d 778,306 N.E.2d 574 
(I973), modified on other grounds, 60 Ill. 2d 330, 328 N.E.2d 5 (1975), is state authority within 
the Seventh Circuit for required rule-making. See also Doyle v. Board of Review, 31 Ill. App. 
3d 968, 334 N.E.2d 776 (I975). 
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mandate specific provisions of rules. While strongly urging the inclusion of 
certain items, the court modified the proposed final judgment so that it 
would "not order HEW specifically to include any items in its new regula-
tion. " 223 Although it is unlikely that HEW would decline such an invitation, 
proper allocation of functions demands that courts not infringe too far into 
the substance of administrative decisions. The doctrine of required rule-
making must not displace the agencies from their delegated functions. 
A court must be extremely careful in its determination to interfere with 
decision-making allocated to the agency by the legislature. The devel-
opment of the required rule-making remedy demands a carefu_l weighing of 
costs and benefits. Courts and commentators often overlook the double 
values inherent in the required rule-making effort. Required rule-making 
aims to compel agencies to formulate and disclose policy. It may also focus 
on the question whether an agency should use notice and comment proce-
dures to develop policy or may make general policy through other processes 
which do not permit general public participation. For example, the NLRB's 
much criticized "Excelsior rule" 224 was promulgated in a formal adjudica-
tive setting. A plurality of the Supreme Court disapproved of such rule-
making because it did not utilize the general public procedures of the 
APA.225 However, the "Excelsior rule" was a laudable effort in the direc-
tion of clarifying and disclosing policy; the procedures the NLRB should 
have used is another, distinct question. Indeed, furtherance of the second 
value, public participation in agency policymaking, may work against the 
first value, encouraging public disclosure of policy, by increasing the 
burden on the agency when it chooses to disclose policy. 226 Of course, both 
values are important and courts should require or encourage agencies both to 
disclose policy and to utilize public procedures. Nonetheless, many times 
policy can be announced without resort to APA procedure. Procedures less 
burdensome than notice and comment may be used to announce policy in the 
form of non-legislative rules. 227 Adjudication may be, and traditionally has 
been, an appropriate means for developing policy. 228 Consequently, a court 
which is inclined to require rule-making must consider two separate ques-
223. 545 F.2d at 1073. 
224. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
225. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763-65 (1969). The Court was correct in 
approving the NLRB's decision because the agency had reached an entirely new determination 
in the Wyman-Gordon case without relying on the rule. The decision took the form of a de novo 
consideration and resulted in an order having its own force, totally independent of the rule. 
Hence, any deficiency in the rulemaking was irrelevant to the case presented to the Supreme 
Court. 
226. Koch, Public Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General 
Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1073-74 (1976). 
227. Id. at 1075. 
228. Clagett, supra note 4, at 83, 86. See generally Sofaer, supra note 4, at 1314-19. 
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tions: first, should the agency be required to create public policy before it 
can act; and second, should the agency be compelled to do so through public 
procedures, either notice and comment procedures for legislative rules or 
some variety of public procedures for non-legislative rules. 
CONCLUSION 
The administrative process is as old as the United States: the first 
session of the First Congress enacted three statutes conferring significant 
administrativ~ powers and eleven important administrative agencies were in 
existence prior to the close of the Civil War. The development of adminis-
trative agencies results from responses to practical problems and, hence, the 
growth of administrative process concepts has proceeded along pragmatic 
lines. Great damage would be done to the utility of the administrative 
process if judicial doctrines were to ignore this pragmatic, problem-solving 
orientation. 
In the Seventies, we have embarked on many ventures to improve the 
process of government. Many of those, though well meaning, have been 
disastrous to the ability of the government to serve its citizens. Those who 
have looked most frequently to the government to solve social problems 
have also lead the fight to disable the government from doing so. Adminis-
trative law must find ways to reconcile these two movements. 
The answers may lie in the careful thinking that has been done in 
confining and controlling administrative discretion. The best of this thinking 
has recognized the practical problems and has set forth principles which can 
reform administrative decision-protecting the citizen from harmful govern-
ment action-without preventing the government from functioning for the 
benefit of its citizens. The government does not exist of its own force; it 
exists only through the force of the needs of its citizens. Government 
functions which do not serve the citizens should be eliminated, not reform-
ed. Where the government process serves the citizens, reform must avoid 
transforming a necessary function into a useless one. 
This article has discussed some of the efforts to reconcile these compet-
ing values in the Seventh Circuit and other jurisdictions. Seventh Circuit 
efforts have often been sophisticated and the circuit remains a leader in the 
search for discretionary justice. 
